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Abstract
Sensor networks are large scale networks of low-power
devices that collaborate in order to perform a given task.
The sensors are limited in battery energy, capacity and com-
putational power. In recent years, researchers have pro-
posed several protocols for such sensor networks assum-
ing that all sensors belong to the same authority. In this pa-
per, we introduce the concept of multi-domain sensor net-
works that was, to the best of our knowledge, never consid-
ered before. We propose a game-theoretic model to investi-
gate the impact of cooperation and show the conditions for
which cooperation is the best strategy.
1. Introduction
Multi-hop wireless networks provide both new network-
ing environments and extensions of existing network infras-
tructures. Sensor networks, in particular, emerge as a new
paradigm of a large scale wireless network for data gather-
ing purposes. Sensor networks have the potential to extend
the current solutions and to open the possibility for more
precise environmental monitoring.
In the literature of sensor networks, it is generally as-
sumed that the sensors are under the control of a single au-
thority. In real deployments of sensor networks, it is rea-
sonable to assume, however, that different sensor networks
are going to be deployed independently of each other in the
same area. Typical examples of future co-located deploy-
ments can be found in freight transport (e.g., vehicle, con-
tainer, and material tracking sensors co-located with con-
trol sensors in the warehouse, airport, harbor, or train sta-
∗ corresponding author
tion), in environmental monitoring (e.g., forest fire, earth-
quake and flood detection sensors), in intelligent buildings
(e.g., material tracking, environmental control, and building
state monitoring networks), and in animal monitoring (e.g.,
where each subset of a herd belongs to a different owner)1.
Even if the sensors perform different tasks, the communi-
cation interface between them is likely to be standardized,
making them able to cooperate with each other.
In our paper, we consider sensor networks that are de-
ployed in the same area, but are controlled by different au-
thorities. In such a situation, sensors may reduce transmis-
sion energy if their packets are forwarded by sensors that
belong to another authority. There is the risk, however, that
the sensors belonging to another authority drop the packets.
The reason can be denial of service attack, lack of agree-
ment on the common goal, etc.
Our goal is to determine the best strategy for the author-
ities that control the sensor networks; for this purpose, we
make use of game theory. We do not rely on any cooperation
enforcement mechanism, but rather we want to see whether
cooperation can exist based solely on the self-interest of the
authorities. Our simulation results show that cooperation of
co-located sensor networks extends their lifetime, thus au-
thorities are better off if they cooperate with each other.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give
an overview of related work. In Section 3, we provide a gen-
eral system model and the corresponding game of multi-
domain sensor networks. Section 4 presents our simulation
results. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
1 For a survey on sensor network applications see [1].
2. Related work
Sensor networks are envisioned to perform distributed
sensing in both military and civilian applications. Due to
the limited capabilities of the sensors (typically energy lim-
itation), such networks need energy-aware protocols to be
deployed. A survey of sensor networks can be found in [1].
Cooperation between several authorities is a new con-
cept in sensor networking. However, the problem of non-
cooperation was already addressed for ad hoc networks. An
approach that addresses cooperation in the absence of any
incentive mechanism is provided by Srinivasan et al. [9].
Their work focuses on the energy aspects of cooperation.
Felegyhazi, Hubaux and Buttyan [4] establish the connec-
tion between the network topology and the possible exis-
tence of cooperation.
Several researchers proposed incentive techniques for ad
hoc networks. Buchegger and Le Boudec [2] define a proto-
col that is based on a reputation system. In their approach,
the nodes observe the behavior of each other and store this
knowledge locally in reputation reports. Zhong, Yang and
Chen [11] present a solution, where an off-line central au-
thority collects receipts from the nodes that relay packets
and remunerates them based on these receipts. Another so-
lution, presented by Buttyan and Hubaux [3], is based on
a virtual currency, called nuglet: If a node wants to send
its own packets, it has to pay for it, whereas if the node
forwards a packet for the benefit of another node, it is re-
warded.
3. Game-theoretic model
In this section, we present our system model and the co-
operative game that enables us to investigate cooperative
packet forwarding in co-located sensor networks.
3.1. System model
We assume a set of small, battery-powered devices called
sensors. For simplicity, we assume that each battery has the
same maximum energy it can store, which we denote by B.
We assume that two sensors are able to communicate with
each other if they reside within transmission range, even
if they belong to different sensor networks; in other words,
inter-operability is ensured by the device manufacturers. We
assume an ideal channel without packet losses; with other
words, we assume that each packet loss is due to the strate-
gic behavior of the sensors.
We also assume that the sensors perform a given task
and that they periodically report their measurements to one
or several base station nodes in the network. We refer to the
base stations as sinks. We further assume that the measure-
ment data can be included in a single message that we call a
packet. We assume that packets have the same size. Hence,
we express the transmission cost C for a single packet as
a function of the transmission distance, in particular we as-
sume C = c · dα, where c is a constant that includes anten-
nae characteristics, d is the distance of the transmission and
2 ≤ α ≤ 5 is the path loss exponent [8]. Without loss of
generality, we assume that c = 1. We assume that a fixed
energy for computation is included in the transmission cost.
We introduce the unit of energy as the transmission cost to
the distance of one meter. We also assume that the energy
consumed by receiving and processing a packet is fixed and
we denote the reception cost by R.
We assume that P sensor networks, each controlled by
a different authority, are co-located on the same area. We
investigate two scenarios:
• Separate sinks: The sinks belong to different authori-
ties (e.g., each sensor network has its own sinks).
• Common sinks: The sinks are common resources used
by all authorities.
We call the set of networking elements controlled by author-
ity i, a domain Di. In the case of the common sink scenario
only the sensors belong to Di, while in the case of the sep-
arate sink scenario the sinks controlled by i are also part of
Di. We define the a domain to be inactive as the time when
the battery of the first sensor in the domain is depleted.
We assume that there exists an energy efficient routing
algorithm that enables sensors to send packets to the sinks
via several hops. The design of energy efficient routing al-
gorithms is a focus of on-going research efforts. Throughout
this paper, we assume that the routing protocol establishes a
minimum energy path from each sensor to the sink, as it is
presented by Ye et al. in [10]. Note that we assume that rout-
ing is performed properly; we postpone the investigation of
selfish behavior in routing as a separate problem to our fu-
ture work. In our model, two routes are established for each
sensor: one route in the own network (non-cooperative rout-
ing) and one route in the common network of all authorities
(cooperative routing). If a sensor runs out of battery, then
its domain is excluded from the game and routes are recal-
culated. We also assume that the communication from the
sinks to the sensors is performed via a single-hop, (i.e., the
sinks have sufficient energy to reach their sensors directly).
3.2. Game
Game theory [5] provides an appropriate tool to model
strategic decision situations. In our system, the authorities
have to decide, whether they help each other to increase the
lifetime of their network or they ignore the possible help
from other sensor networks and rely on their own network
to achieve their goal. We model this cooperative packet for-
warding situation, as a multi-stage game G = (P,S,U),
where P denotes the set of players2, S the set of strategies
and U is the set of utility functions. We assume that if a do-
main becomes inactive (as defined in Section 3.1), it is ex-
cluded from the game. The game ends when the last do-
main becomes inactive. Note that in the last phase of the
game there is only one domain.
We assume that the time is divided into time units called
time slots. Once per time slot t the sensors of each domain
send measurement packets towards the sinks. The length of
a time slot is defined by the frequency of the packet send-
ing and it has no effect on the game. We assume that the
time slot is long enough to deliver all packets to the sink.
Correspondingly, we assume that the sensors wake up al-
most synchronously to report to the sinks. We will consider
the effect of asynchronous wake-up in our future work.
In each time slot, each of the players i has to define
two actions for its domain (a) whether its sensors and sinks
should forward the packets of sensors in domain Dj , where
j 6= i, or not (in case they are asked to forward), and (b)
whether to request the sensors and sinks belonging to other
domains to forward the packets of sensors in Di or to send
the packets only within Di3. We refer to the decision of any
player i in time slot t as a move mi(t). Note that the play-
ers apply the same move for each packet of each other do-
main in a given time slot t. We use the following short no-
tation for the possible moves of the players:
• DD (don’t ask/drop): do not ask others to forward and
drop all packets from others if asked for help
• DF (don’t ask/forward): do not ask others to forward
and forward all packets from others if asked for help
• AD (ask/drop): ask others to forward and drop all pack-
ets from others if asked for help
• AF (ask/forward): ask others to forward and forward
all packets from others if asked for help
We further assume that each player has to perform a move
exactly once in each time slot. We denote the vector of the
moves of all players in time slot t by m¯(t). Note that the
decision does not affect the reception. We assume that if a
sensor is active, it will always receive packets.
We define ξi(t) ∈ {true, false}, the success of the mea-
surement in time slot t as follows. In each time slot t, player
i evaluates the proportion of its sensors from which it has re-
ceived measurement data denoted by ρi(t). If ρi(t) ≥ SRi,
where SRi is a required number of measurement data de-
fined by the application, then the measurement is successful
(meaning that ξi(t) = true); otherwise ξi(t) = false.
If the measurement is successful, then player i receives
a gain gi(t) = Gi; otherwise it receives gi(t) = 0. The
2 We model authorities as players in the game, meaning that |P| = P .
3 Note that in the separate sink scenario, the decision of player i applies
also to the sinks in Di.
player has a cost in time slot t denoted by ci(t) that repre-
sents the total transmission and reception cost of all sen-
sors that belong to i for all packets (both for own pack-
ets and packets for the opponents). In general, we can as-
sume that Gi >> ci(t) in any time slot t, meaning that
the possible benefit received from successful information
sending is higher than the value of the total cost (i.e., it is
worth to send packets towards the sinks). We assign a pay-
off pii(t) = gi(t)− ci(t) to each player i for each time slot
of the game.
A strategy si ∈ S is a function that defines the move of
player i for a time slot t + 1 given the success of player i in
the previous time slot. Here S stands for the set of all pos-
sible strategies. We can write the strategy of player i as:
mi(t + 1) = si[ξi(t)] (1)
In order to reduce the complexity of the sensors, it is
reasonable to assume that there is a pre-programmed packet
forwarding strategy stored at each sensor. Each sink informs
its own sensors about the success of gathering the last mea-
surement, as an input of this strategy4 [6], hence the feed-
back can be included in a single bit. Our solution is benefi-
cial, because it minimizes the reception energy of the feed-
back.
In our analysis, we define the utility as the cumulative
payoff for the nodes in the packet forwarding game (hence
Ui =
∑T
t=0 pii(t)), where T denotes the lifetime of the
domain controlled by player i. The goal of the players is
to maximize their utility in the game. Intuitively, this goal
means to report measurement successfully as many times as
possible, while minimizing their energy consumption (max-
imizing their lifetime).
We assume that players are rational and that rationality is
a common knowledge (meaning that they know that the oth-
ers are rational as well). We also assume that the constitu-
tion of the game is known to every player, thus they are able
to analyze it and act according to the analysis.
4. Simulation results
In this section, we present our simulation results
in which we have identified the best packet transmis-
sion strategies in randomly generated scenarios. We
also quantify the difference between equilibrium strate-
gies.
We assume two authorities that deploy their sensor net-
work in the same area, in such a way that they are initially
connected. In our simulations, we investigate both the sepa-
rate sink and the common sink scenario: In the separate sink
4 In the common sink scenario, the common sinks inform the sensors in
each domain.
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Figure 1. Effect of the network size on cooperation; (a) in the separate sink scenario and (b) in
the common sink scenario. (c) Ratio of the utility achieved by defection with respect to the util-
ity achieved by cooperation (δ) as a function of the network size.
scenario, we put one sink per domain in two different posi-
tions; and in the common sink scenario, we put a single sink
in the middle of the simulation area.
Table 1 presents our simulation parameters5.
Parameter Value
Number of sensors per domain 10–50 (25)
Distribution of the sensors uniformly random
Area size 40x20m
Reception energy (R) 100 units
Path loss exponent 2–5 (4)
Success requirement (SRi) 1.0
Positions of the sinks (separate sinks) [10,10] and [30,10]
Positions of the sink (common sink) [20,10]
Route selection minimum energy path
Table 1. Parameter values of the simulations
For a given set of parameters, we performed 100 simula-
tion runs, each corresponding to a different topology of the
sensors. For each simulation run, we performed an exhaus-
tive search on the available strategy space to identify pos-
sible Nash equilibria6 [7]. For each player, we determined
the Nash equilibrium (or several Nash equilibria) that re-
sult(s) in the highest utility. We observed that in each of the
selected Nash equilibria, the game stabilizes in the follow-
ing pair (or pairs) of moves:
• Defective equilibrium: The players end up in playing
the moves DD-DD.
• Cooperative equilibrium: The players end up in play-
ing the moves AF-AF.
5 We present the default values of variables in parenthesis.
6 Recall that in a Nash equilibrium, none of the players can increase its
utility by unilaterally changing its strategy.
• Other equilibria: The equilibrium is different from
the ones above.
Defective equilibria always exist in the network, which
is not always true for cooperative and other equilibria. Con-
sequently, if several types of equilibria exist in the network
(typically both defective and cooperative equilibria), we de-
fine δ as the ratio of the utility achieved by defection with
respect to the utility achieved by cooperation:
δ =
∑
i∈P
Ui(defective)
Ui(cooperative)
(2)
Figure 1a presents the number of different equilibria in
the separate sink scenario as a function of the network size.
We can observe that the number of cooperative equilibria is
much higher than the number of other types of equilibria.
Furthermore, as we increase the number of sensors in the
domains, the number of simulation runs with cooperation as
the best equilibrium decreases.
It is important to emphasize that in the separate sink sce-
nario, the players control their sinks as well. Thus, the dom-
inance of cooperation might be the result of the presence of
the sink of the other domain (which enables shorter routes)
and not the result of cooperation between the sensor net-
works. To investigate the effect of cooperation in the sen-
sor networks, we present results in the common sink sce-
nario. Our results show that this effect decreases as network
size increases.
Figure 1b presents the number of different equilibria in
the common sink scenario as a function of the network size.
We can see that the number of defective equilibria is ap-
proximately the same than the number of cooperative equi-
libria. As we increase the network size, however, the num-
ber of defective equilibria increases and the number of co-
operative equilibria decreases. The reason is that with the
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Figure 2. The effect of α on cooperation in the
common sink scenario.
increasing density of sensors, the reception power domi-
nates the energy consumption.
Figure 1c presents δ as a function of the network size.
We see that in the separate sink scenario, δ is much less
than in the common sink scenario, thus choosing cooper-
ation is more beneficial with respect to defection. In both
scenarios, δ increases with the network size.
Figure 2 presents the number of different equilibria in the
common sink scenario as a function of α. The figure shows
that as the path loss exponent increases (which represents a
more hostile environment) the number of defective equilib-
ria drops significantly; at the same time the number of coop-
erative equilibria increases significantly. This shows that the
more hostile the environment is, the more beneficial the co-
operation is.
Figure 3 presents δ as a function of the path loss expo-
nent. as no cooperative equilibria exist for α = 2, we can
present the results only for α > 2. We can observe that the
more hostile the environment is, the better cooperation is
with respect to defection.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a game-theoretic model
to study cooperation in multi-domain sensor networks. The
limited computation and energy resources of the sensors
motivated us to investigate cooperation in the absence of in-
centive mechanisms. Our results show that the energy sav-
ing by cooperation provides a “natural incentive” for the au-
thorities. The benefit of cooperation is twofold: (a) the au-
thorities can have a significant benefit by providing service
of their sinks for other’s sensor networks and (b) if sinks are
common resources, then cooperative packet forwarding is
beneficial for sparse networks or if the environment is hos-
tile.
In terms of future work, we will investigate the effect of
different lifetime definitions. We will also take the effect of
asynchronous wakeup of the sensors into account.
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